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This is the first paper that analyzes for a global sample how trade agreements that include technology-
related provisions impact exports of goods, and how this impact differs depending on the technology 
content of the goods. It includes estimations of a structural gravity model for a panel of 176 countries 
over the period 1995-2015. The model differentiates between provisions relating technology transfer, 
technical cooperation, research and development (R&D), and patents and intellectual property rights. 
It also estimates the differences in these effects depending on whether the trade flow in question is 
between countries with similar or different levels of development. The main results indicate that 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) that contain technology provisions generate a significantly higher 
volume of trade than RTAs that do not, after controlling for the depth of the RTAs. For countries that 
ratify RTAs that include such provisions, it is exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the 
most. Trade agreements including such provisions have a heterogeneous effect that varies by income 
level of the trading partners and depends on the extent to which the RTA incorporates other 
provisions. 
Keywords: sectoral exports; trade agreements; gravity model; PPML; technology transfer; 
innovation; Intellectual Property Rights. 
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Trade Agreements and International Technology Transfer 
1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the defining feature of international economic relations has been the proliferation of 
trade agreements, which have filled what Bhagwati (1995) described as the “spaghetti bowl” to the 
brim. Over time, however, these agreements have become more complex and have gone from 
focusing solely on tariff reductions –shallow agreements– to having a much wider scope –deep 
agreements– in which technology transfer provisions have gone from being the exception to the rule. 
In 2019, many countries were negotiating or planning to negotiate free trade agreements. In particular, 
negotiations between the European Union (EU) and third countries were successfully concluded with 
Japan and Singapore in 2019 and with Vietnam in 2020. However, EU negotiations with India, which 
started in 2007, were brought to a de facto standstill in 2013, and the same happened with Malaysia in 
2012 and Thailand in 2014. Feasibility studies on the consequences of such commitments can delay 
agreements for years. For instance, some critical issues in the EU-India negotiation are generic 
medicine production in India, the existence of technological transfer restrictions and the EU interest in 
patent protection.  
A relevant issue surrounding the negotiations of regional trade agreements (RTAs)
1
 is how the type of 
innovation and technology exchange provisions included in the RTA could affect trade flows. This is 
the main subject of this paper. We hypothesize that the effects will depend on the products exported 
by the negotiating countries and on their level of development. We should expect the effect to be 
heterogeneous across goods, being stronger on goods that are more technology intensive. In our 
empirical analysis, we differentiate between high, low and medium technology-intensive goods. The 
effect on aggregated trade should represent an overall effect. Although an effect on FDI or cross-
border patent flows also seems plausible, we focus exclusively on trade flows.	 When an FTA is 
																																								 																				
1
 We refer to RTAs as they are defined in the WTO: “RTAs, which are reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two 





signed, the affected firms benefit from free trade and do not need to pursue internationalization 
strategies through FDI, given that tariff/non-tariff measures are no longer barriers to trade. 
This paper therefore seeks to answer three elemental questions. First, to what extent do technology 
clauses included in RTAs affect trade flows? Second, what kind of goods do they affect the most, 
distinguishing between the technological content of goods according to a classification proposed by 




With this aim, we compiled a database of RTAs with technology transfer and innovation-related 
provisions, drawing on a detailed analysis of the fine print of trade agreements that have entered into 
force in the last decades. We classified provisions into four subgroups: general intention to transfer 
technology, technical cooperation, intellectual property, and joint work on R&D. Using these data in 
combination with bilateral trade flows and gravity variables, the effect of these provisions on trade are 
evaluated distinguishing between RTAs with and without technology provisions and controlling for 
the depth of the RTA. Methodologically, we estimated a gravity model using bilateral exports among 
176 countries over the period from 1995 to 2015 to examine whether RTAs impact trade differently 
depending on which technology-related provisions they include. Our estimations distinguished 
between the four possible types of clauses.
3
 For instance, the RTA between the EU and the Caribbean 
Community (EU-CARIFORUM) establishes the intensification of activities to promote innovation 
and technology transfer between the parties (article 135). The Japan-Indonesia RTA establishes 
explicit technical cooperation in the telecommunications sector (article 134), whereas the Chile-
Australia RTA regulates trade in R&D and innovation (article 18.3).  Finally, the South Korea-United 
States agreement includes the protection of intellectual property rights (chapter 18). More specifically, 
Article 18.11 states the obligation to ratify and comply with the 10 international agreements listed; 
these include conventions, such as Paris and Berne, and treaties, such as Budapest and Singapore.	The 
																																								 																				
2
	For this purpose we chose the classification of goods of high, medium and low technological content, to try to observe 
whether the clauses effectively produce a sophistication of trade. In relation to countries, we use the United Nations 
definition, which for 2017 lists developed (North) and developing countries (South). 
3
 In all of these cases, the effects do not derive exclusively from trade between the signatory countries, but also from the 
specific cooperation instruments that are used as vehicles for RTAs.  
4	
	
provisions mostly refer to all goods, but also contain specific references to given categories such as 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products (art 18.9).
4
 
To our knowledge, the only related study (Campi and Dueñas, 2018) focuses exclusively on the 
effects on trade of RTAs with intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions. The authors estimate a 
traditional gravity model that disregards multilateral resistance factors, the exclusion of which is 
known to generate biases in the estimated coefficients. The main novelties of our study are threefold. 
First, we extend the types of provisions analyzed to include technical cooperation, innovation, and 
technology transfer, in addition to IPR. The second novelty is a methodological improvement, since 
we estimate a structural gravity model with multilateral resistance terms using the latest techniques 
put forward in the international trade literature (Head and Mayer, 2014; Yotov et al., 2016; Zylkin, 
2016). Finally, we are able to isolate the effect of the technology-type provisions by controlling for 
the depth of the RTAs, the participation of the signatory countries in the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
5
 and for membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and currency unions. If excluded from the model, all these factors could 
generate biases in the estimation of the main effect. 
Our main results show that RTAs that include technology transfer provisions generate a significantly 
higher volume of trade, which in some cases goes beyond the increase generated by RTAs without 
these provisions. If we break the results down by sector for countries that ratify RTAs with 
technology provisions rather than ones without, it is the exports of technology-intensive goods that 
increase the most. Broken down by levels of economic development, the effects are found to be 
heterogeneous and also depend on the number of provisions covered by the RTA.
6
 
This article is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on the impact of technology 
content provisions on trade; the different types of transfer provisions and the empirical evidence are 
																																								 																				
4
 Some provisions on technology transfer address the interests of strategic sectors, such as laboratories in the case of patents 
or intellectual property, or industrial sectors supported by the government and for which cooperation in technological matters 
is included.	
5
 The TRIPS agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property. It came into effect in 
1995. 
6
 Another possibility would be to distinguish the sectoral impact on agricultural trade, industrial trade or even trade in 
services, in a possible extension of this work. The North-South division allows us to analyse the impact of the treaties if they 
are signed by countries with the same or different levels of development, considering as usual North as developed countries 
and South as developing countries, following UN distinction as we see later in the paper.    
5	
	
described in section 3; the specification of the gravity model and estimation methodology are detailed 
in section 4; section 5 presents the results by type of good and type of technology transfer clause, and 
by the level of development of the trade partners in question. Section 6 outlines our conclusions.  
2. Technology Transfer and Trade 
There are two ways in which trade agreements can generate technological spillover: indirectly, 
through an increase in trade flows; and directly, if they include specific technology related 
provisions.
7
 On the one hand, indirect spillovers are analyzed in Hoppe (2005), who concludes that 
there are three factors that might affect technology transfer: 1) direct efforts to make the transfer 
successful; 2) the capacity to adopt new technologies; 3) the fundamental differences between the 
donor country and receptor country. Trade enables technology transfer through imports of capital 
goods and openness to export markets that enable learning-by-doing, thus increasing total factor 
productivity (TFP). These types of external benefits are usually referred to as technological 
knowledge spillovers.	Trade might provide technology to the importer, surpassing what it would have 
acquired or developed itself. Along these lines, Keller (2004) concludes that there is evidence that 
imports are a significant channel for technology diffusion. For instance, bilateral relations may 
provide information on technologies developed abroad, when the importer receives and analyzes the 
good. Alternatively, migrations could also provide such information. People with different 
technological backgrounds may travel to the destination country carrying their different knowledge, 
which they transfer to the local population in the importing country
8
. Introducing a product with 
innovative technology content into the market can accelerate competition and learning, enabling 
countries to reach international standards through contact with foreign products that leads to a 
spillover effect. Similarly, Madsen (2007) draws on 135 years of data on TFP and imports with high-
technology content for OECD countries and finds that there is a robust relationship between TFP and 
																																								 																				
7
 The mechanism is direct when these provisions entail cooperation, technical assistance, regulatory changes or enforcement 
mechanisms. For example, the EU-CARIFORUM agreement covers support for the promotion of innovation, diversification, 
modernization, development and product and process quality in businesses and in the intensification of activities promoting 
those links. It also provides enforcement mechanisms concerning intellectual property rights, including corrective measures 
and penalties in case of infringement. 
8
	An additional technology transfer mechanism may be mergers or acquisitions with foreign FDI, where new technologies 
spill over into the host sector. In fact, the exchange of goods, services or ideas (people) can lead to technology transfer, even 
through informal channels, or through educational exchange programs. In this paper we only study one specific mechanism.	
6	
	
knowledge imports. Specifically, technological knowledge spillovers contributed to TFP-related 
convergence among OECD countries between 1870 and 2004. This spillover effect may arise with or 
without the presence of RTAs.  
On the other hand, direct transfers of technology require explicit commitments in the agreements, 
which are not necessarily found in all of them. RTAs can be used as a tool to increase technology 
transfer not just through trade itself but also through specific provisions that regulate this transfer and 
cover aspects related to technical cooperation.
9
 The technology-related provisions that are included in 
deep RTAs mostly refer to all goods, but also contain specific references to certain sectors. For 
example, Chapter 2 of the RTA between the EU and CARICOM is dedicated to Innovation and IPR. 
Section 1 contains six articles, of which two refer to specific sectors, namely, information and 
telecommunication technologies and renewable energy.  In section 2, most articles refer to all sectors, 
with special references to plant varieties and animals.  It contains four subsections dedicated to listing 
the main principals, defining standards and covering enforcement and cooperation matters. According 
to subsection 1, the signatory countries have a transition period in which to enact the corresponding 
national laws required to comply with the given obligations; this period is 6 years in general and 12 
years for least developed countries. Moreover, special references to compliance with international 
agreements, such as TRIPS and WIPO, are included. The wording used is “signatory countries shall 
comply with…”. Subsection 4 gives a very detailed description of the procedures concerning 
infringement of the obligations, remedies and corrective measures to be applied. 
A second example is the agreement between the US and South Korea, which dedicates 12 articles in 
Chapter 18 to IPR. Article 18.11 states the obligation to ratify and comply with the 10 international 
agreements listed. These include conventions, such as Paris and Berne, and treaties, such as Budapest 
and Singapore. Only one article (18.9) refers to “certain regulated products”, specifically to 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. Since most RTAs with technology provisions 
specifically state that members have to comply with TRIPS, it is important to refer here to the main 
purpose of this agreement. TRIPS is a minimum standards multilateral agreement concerning 
																																								 																				
9
 Ivus (2010) points to the existence of a virtuous circle by showing that better consolidated property rights have positive 
effects on trade. 
7	
	
intellectual property that provides protection for nearly all forms of IPR in the member countries. 
Those countries are free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the 
agreement in accordance with their own legal system. TRIPS also includes enforcement, remedies and 
dispute resolution procedures. Although the idea is that all WTO members will have to comply with 
TRIPS, specific transition periods were originally established giving developing countries more time 
–initially until 2005– to adapt their legal system to certain obligations and to comply with them. The 
waiver has been extended up to 2013 for the least developed countries and until 2016 for certain 
obligations, mostly concerning pharmaceutical products. Detailed information can be found on the 
WTO website.  
The main difference between TRIPS and the technology provisions included in the RTAs is that the 
latter are a means to reinforce the compliance mechanisms and concretize the technical cooperation 
procedures already established in TRIPS; they also serve as a bridge to ensure enforcement of the 
national regulations.  
Intellectual property has been analyzed in Campi and Dueñas (2018), who explore how RTAs with 
IPR chapters affected trade for a panel of 110 countries over 19 years. The authors distinguish 
between products that are highly intellectual property-intensive and those that are not, finding that the 
results are similar for both types of goods. Surprisingly, the authors find that trade flows between 
developed countries benefit most, while no important gains for developing countries are observed. 
However, they estimate a gravity model that does not incorporate the so-called time-variant 
multilateral resistance terms and excludes zero trade flows from the analysis. Generally speaking, 
these two factors generate biases in the RTA effects (Head and Mayer, 2014).   
Finally, Dhingra et al. (2018) examine the contribution of deep non-tariff provisions on international 
trade in goods and services. When considering IPR provisions separately, they do not find that RTAs 
with these provisions boost gross bilateral trade in goods. This could be due to the fact that many of 
the trade agreements in force are not covered by their limited sample of 43 countries. We contribute to 
the cited literature by using a global sample of countries, applying an enhanced econometric 




3. Trade Agreements Containing Technology Provisions 
To carry out this study, we created a database that drew on a detailed analysis of the fine print of trade 
agreements. The process started by screening information from the legal text of 302 bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements filed with the WTO, the World Bank, or the Organization of American 
States (OAS). From these agreements we selected those coded as free trade agreements (FTAs), 
economic integration agreements (EIAs), FTAs & EIAs and Custom Unions (CUs), thus excluding 
Partial Scope Agreements (PSAs) and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)
10
. The remaining 
agreements in our dataset total 231, of which 201 were signed between 1995 and 2015, which is the 
period covered in our empirical analysis. We categorized agreements depending on whether they 
contained provisions on general intention to transfer technology; technical cooperation; R&D and 
innovation; and patents and intellectual property.
11
  
More specifically, the first category “general intention to transfer technology” refers to RTAs that 
include innovation policies, participation in framework programs on innovation, the promotion of 
technology transfer and dissemination of new technologies. The second category “technical 
cooperation” lists shared research projects, exchange of researchers, and development of public-
private partnerships as objectives of the RTAs. In the third group “ R&D and innovation” the text of 
the RTAs refers to collaboration in research and development projects and innovation. Finally, the 
fourth group “patents and intellectual property rights” contain RTAs with provisions that refer to 
patenting activities and intellectual property in the corresponding regulatory framework, obligations 
and enforcement mechanisms. We believe that the categories allow us to better distinguish between 
general intentions, specific forms of cooperation, commitments and obligations, which is important 
for the empirical analysis. We analyzed the text of the agreements in order to identify commitments 
around this set of categories. The distribution of exports depending on the type of provision included 
is shown in Figure 1. 
																																								 																				
10
In a previous version, we included Partial Scope Agreements (PSA) and Economic Cooperation Agreements (ECA) 
examining a total of 302 agreements. We have eliminated them from this section since the empirical analysis only considers 
RTAs that are at least FTAs. 
11
 We consider the full set of free trade agreements that have been notified to the WTO up to December 2016, in keeping 
with the methodology proposed by Hofmann et al. (2018). The authors classified trade agreements based on the provisions 
they include on different aspects such as environment, labor, social and intellectual property rights issues. In the empirical 
analysis we restrict the sample to those RTAs signed after 1994, since trade data from UNCTAD disaggregated by 
technological content are only available from 1995 onwards. 
9	
	
Figure 1. Distribution of Aggregated Exports by Type of Provision 
	  
Source: Compiled by the authors based on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. 
The sum of the four categories is greater than the number of agreements because there are agreements 
that include more than one of the types of technology provision considered here. All the same, our 
analysis reveals that most agreements contain just one type of technology provision. In particular, 158 
RTAs contain only one type, whereas 32 include all four types analyzed and 73 have none.  
Among the agreements that include all four areas, the main proponents are the EU (with Caribbean, 
North African and Eastern European countries, Central America, Chile, Israel and South Africa) and 
EFTA (with Colombia and Peru), Costa Rica (with China and Singapore), the United States (with 
Panama and Peru) and Chile (with Turkey), some of which are geographically close to the other party 
(for example the US-Panama agreement) and some of which are not (Costa Rica-Singapore).  
Among the agreements that do not include any of these clause types, many are between developing 
countries, with fewer between developed and developing countries (5 promoted by the EU, 7 by 
EFTA, 2 by the US).  
Looking at the distribution of bilateral export flows, a comparison of flows between pair of countries 
























(Figure 2) reveals that the distribution of exports is further to the right for countries with RTAs, and 
when these RTAs have such provisions they tend to trade more with each other. A similar outcome is 
obtained when Kernel density estimates are shown for high-, medium- and low-technology-content 
export flows (See Figures A.1-A-3 in the appendix). 
Figure 2. Distribution of Aggregated Exports by Type of Agreement  
 
 Source: Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lexp is ln of total exports. Years 1995 to 2017. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
In this section we first outline the main hypotheses and then present the model specification (4.1), 
data description (4.2) and main results (4.3). The stylized facts described in sections 2 and 3 indicate 
that the technology provisions found in the RTAs mostly refer to all goods traded, but also contain 
specific references to certain categories. This is particularly so for the pharmaceutical and chemical 
sectors, renewable energies and plant varieties and animals. Therefore, we start with an analysis at 
aggregate level and proceed with a separate analysis for specific sectors. We distinguish between 






















The main hypotheses are: 1) Shallow RTAs have a positive effect on trade in goods due to the 
elimination of tariffs among the member countries
12
, whereas deep agreements have a greater trade 
effect. 2) With the inclusion of technology-related provisions, which stimulate technology transfer 
and protect innovations, a direct technology-related effect on trade is generated, in addition to the 
expected positive effect postulated in 1). 3) The direct and indirect effects could vary depending on 
the type of goods traded and the level of development of the trading partners. 4) The effects could 
vary by provision.  
4.1 Specifications for the Gravity Model 
The gravity model has been widely used to predict bilateral trade flows between countries as it is 
nowadays considered to be a structural model with solid theoretical underpinnings (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2016; 
Allen, Arkolakis, and Takahashi, 2014). It is particularly appropriate for estimating the effects of 
trade policies and the importance of the costs of trade that are associated with distance and trade 
facilitation factors.  
Our estimations will capture the effects on bilateral trade of RTAs without and with technology 
provisions. When an RTA does not contain such provisions, the effect on trade will be solely due to 
the elimination of trade barriers. RTAs with provisions will have an extra “direct” effect on trade due 
to the increasing collaboration in R&D and the protection of IPR, particularly in technology-intensive 
sectors. The econometric model captures the differences between RTAs with and without technology 
provisions controlling for the number of other provisions that are not trade-related. In other words, we 
compare agreements of similar depth and in this way the try to mimic the counterfactual, that is, 
similar RTAs without those provisions. 
Two of the model’s most widely appreciated properties are its structural flexibility, which can 
accommodate the different factors that affect trade, and its predictive power for aggregate trade flows. 
In its simplest form, when applied to trade, the gravity model predicts that the bilateral exports 
																																								 																				
12
	Shallow integration involves the elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and services across national borders 




between two countries are directly proportional to the product of their economic “mass” and inversely 
proportional to the costs of trade (distance) between them.  
According to the underlying theory that has been reformulated and extended by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), the model assumes constant elasticity of substitution and product differentiation by 
place of origin. In addition, prices differ among locations due to symmetric bilateral trade costs. The 










	              (1) 
where Xijt is bilateral exports from country i to country j in year t, and Yit, Yjt and Yt
W
 are the gross 
domestic products in, respectively the exporting country, the importing country and the world in year 
t. tijt denotes trade costs between the exporter and the importer in year t and Pit and Pjt are the so-
called multilateral resistance terms (MRT).
13
 σ is the elasticity of substitution between all goods. 
The log-linearized specification of the gravity model is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑋!"# = 𝛿! + 𝛼! ln𝑌!" + 𝛼! ln𝑌!" +(1 − 𝜎)𝑙𝑛 𝑡!"# − (1 − 𝜎) 𝑙𝑛𝑃!" − (1 − 𝜎) 𝑙𝑛𝑃!" +
𝜀 !"#                  (2) 
          
where t represents annual periods; Xijt are the exports from country i to country j in period t in current 
US dollars. Yit (Yjt) indicates the exporter’s (importer’s) GDP, all of which are expressed in natural 
logarithms (ln) and the constant (𝛿!) represents world income that varies over time. The trade cost 
between the trading partners is usually proxied with time-invariant and time-variant factors that 
facilitate or hamper trade. Among the former are the geographic distance between countries i and j 
and other bilateral dummy variables that take the value of 1 if countries i and j share a language, have 
a shared border, or have colonial ties
14
. Among the latter are: being a member of a trade agreement 
																																								 																				
13
	Multilateral resistance terms reflect relative trade costs with respect to the rest of the world. This concept was introduced 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) into the gravity model. Bilateral trade is not only affected by bilateral interactions, but 
also by interactions with the rest of the world. 
14
	Other geographical factors that vary by country, such as the geographic area (Area) of countries i and j and dummy 
variables that indicate whether they have access to the sea (Landlock) have also been used in the traditional gravity literature.	
13	
	
(RTA), currency union (CU), the WTO or having ratified TRIPS. Finally, εijt is the error term and is 
assumed to be identically and independently distributed. 
Estimating the coefficient for the RTA variable will allow us to evaluate the change in bilateral 
exports using information from before and after the entry into force of each agreement, indicating 
whether or not exports between each pair of RTA member countries have increased significantly as a 
consequence of access to the integration area. In the following estimations, we also distinguish 
between RTAs depending on whether they include any of the four types of technology transfer clause 
described above.  
In line with the recent gravity literature, the MRT are modeled as time-varying country-specific 
dummies, as specified in equation (3) below. And to overcome the potential endogeneity of the RTA 
variable we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and introduce bilateral time-invariant dummy 
variables to account for all unobserved heterogeneity that is attached to each country pair relationship. 
𝑙𝑛 𝑋!"# = 𝛿!" + 𝜏!" +𝜑!" + 𝛾𝑇𝑃!"# + 𝛽!𝑅𝑇𝐴!"#$! + 𝜀 !"#     (3)	 	
 
where the RTA variable denotes both countries (country pair ij) being members of trade agreements in 
period t, and k indicates whether the agreement contains provisions on innovation and technology 
transfer (RTA_tech, k=1) or does not (RTA_notech, k=2). We also consider the depth of the 
agreement (RTA_depth, k=3). RTA_depth indicates the depth of the agreement, where depth is 
defined on the basis of the number of provisions covered and is taken from Dür et al. (2014).
15
 TPijt 
represents other time-variant trade cost variables, as described below equation (2), namely, CU, WTO 
and TRIPS. The fixed (bilateral) effects associated with trade, δij, represent the time-invariant 
characteristics of the trade relationship between i and j and are included to avoid biases due to 
unobservable factors that affect trade. Given that the influence of variables that are bilateral and time-
invariant —such as geographical distance, a common language, or a shared border— is absorbed by 
fixed bilateral effects, the estimated coefficients for these factors are not directly obtained in this 
specification of the model. 
																																								 																				
15
	It is important to include this variable as agreements that include technology provisions could have a different effect on 
trade for all types of exports depending on whether the agreements are deep and comprehensive, or only shallow. The 
correlation between RTA_depth and RTA_tech is low.	
14	
	
Exporter-time τit and importer-time φjt fixed effects represent all the factors that are specific to each 
country and time period and affect trade flows. These are included to control for inward and outward 
multilateral resistance, that is, third countries’ barriers to trade that affect the costs of trade, mainly to 
account for factors such as relative prices, institutions, infrastructure, or legal factors that vary by 
country and over time, including the exporter’s/importer’s GDP. Consequently, the inclusion of MRT 
in the form of dummy variables for each exporter-time and importer-time pair absorbs the effects of 
the income of the trading countries. The inclusion of these three sets of fixed effects (bilateral, 
exporter-period, and importer-period) has been recommended in the literature as a suitable way of 
identifying the effects of RTAs on trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Yotov et al., 2016). 
Even though it is common practice to estimate the gravity model in its log-linear form, there are many 
advantages to estimating the model in its multiplicative form using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator (PPML), as originally suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
16
 First, 
the log-transformation of the dependent variable leads to the loss of the zero trade flows and when the 
zeros are not arbitrarily missing data or random rounding errors, they could carry important 
information. These zeros could be due to high trade barriers or regular rounding errors associated with 
small trade flows; as such, dropping these observations will produce inconsistent estimates
17
. While 
there are a number of ways to overcome the problem of zero trade flows,
18
 PPML is preferred here as 
it is straightforward in its application and avoids the theoretically inconsistent method of replacing 
zero trade flows with an arbitrary value. A second argument in favor of this approach is that, 
according to Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), estimating the gravity model in its log-linear form 
rather than in levels can lead to misleading conclusions in the presence of heteroskedasticity as the log 
transformation affects the disturbances. The PPML estimator resolves this issue, as it is valid under 
general forms of heteroskedasticity.  
																																								 																				
16
	For the implementation of this estimation method, the newly available Stata command ppml_panel_sg (Zylkin, 2017) was 
employed.	
17
	While the data extracted from UNCTAD did not contain any zeros,
 
balancing the data to obtain all possible importer, 
exporter and year combinations led to a large number of observations for which trade values were missing, either because 
they were not reported or they were actually zero. 	
18




The rapid ongoing development of new techniques for estimating the model based on theoretical 
developments has given rise to a series of practical recommendations documented in Head and Mayer 
(2014) and more recently in Yotov et al. (2016). The authors also suggest proxying MRT and bilateral 
unobserved heterogeneity using the three abovementioned sets of fixed effects. In line with these 
developments, the specification for the structural gravity model is as follows: 
𝑋!"# = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝛿!" + 𝜏!" +𝜑!" + 𝛾𝑇𝑃!"# + 𝛽!𝑅𝑇𝐴!"#$! + 𝜀 !"#  (4)	 	 	 	 	
where the variables are as described below equations (2) and (3).     
4.2. Data Sources and Variables 
The data on total exports and exports disaggregated by technology intensity came from UNCTAD 
(unctadstat.org). The classification used here is based on Lall (2000) and divides products into three 
groups depending on their level of technology content: high (HT), medium (MT), and low (LT). The 
HT group contains products that use advanced technologies and change rapidly, which thus require 
significant investment in R&D and a focus on product design. Some examples are aircraft and 
telecommunication equipment, pharmaceutical products and medicaments (see Table A.2 in the 
Appendix). The MT group includes capital goods and intermediate products that use skill-intensive 
technologies and form the basis for industrial activity in mature economies. They tend to include 
complex technologies with relatively high levels of R&D, require advanced skills, and extended 
periods of learning. Goods in the engineering and automotive subgroups require considerable 
interaction between firms to achieve technical efficiency. Finally, the LT group contains stable 
technologies that are already widespread. These technologies are used in capital equipment at the 
lower end of the range and are based on relatively simple skills. Many traded products in this group 
are homogenous and compete on price, and include textiles, garments and footwear. The labor costs 
of these tend to play a significant part in their competitiveness. As economies of scale and barriers to 
entry for these products are generally low, the end market tends to grow slowly, with income 
elasticities below one. 
With regard to the data sources for the explanatory variables used in this paper, the data for GDP were 
obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2019), while data on 
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distance, shared border, common language, colonial ties, geographic area, and access to the sea came 
from CEPII. The construction of RTA variables by type was explained in section 3. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the model and the corresponding descriptive 
statistics: means, standard deviations, maximums, and minimums. The list of countries included can 
be found in the Appendix (Table A.1). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Exports 697,428 293086.7 4059546 0 5.04E+08 
Exports HT 697,428 60198.84 1245627 0 2.27E+08 
Exports MT 697,428 63212.08 910406.4 0 8.50E+07 
Exports LT 697,428 42204.89 744460.8 0 1.53E+08 
Ln Total Exports 427,201 7.462 4.087 -6.908 20.038 
Ln Exports HT 305,137 5.493 4.070 -6.908 19.241 
Ln Exports MT 334,617 6.131 4.043 -6.908 18.258 
Ln Exports LT 349,748 5.552 3.995 -6.908 18.844 
Ln GDP_exporter 646,215 23.685 2.375 16.395 30.523 
Ln GDP_importer 643,634 23.652 2.399 16.216 30.523 
Ln distance 697,428 8.737 0.822 0.632 9.899 
Common Language 697,428 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Common Border 697,428 0.016 0.124 0 1 
Colonial ties 697,428 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Ln area_exporter 697,428 11.458 2.511 3.332205 16.11656 
Ln area_importer 697,428 11.389 2.583 2.302585 16.11656 
Landlocked_exporter 697,428 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Landlocked_importer 697,428 0.201 0.401 0 1 
WTO Membership 697,428 0.586 0.493 0 1 
TRIPS 697,428 0.316 0.465 0 1 
Common currency 661,704 0.012 0.109 0 1 
RTA_tech (with technology 
provisions) 697,428 0.052 0.223 0 1 
RTA_notech (without 
technology provisions) 697,428 0.033 0.178 0 1 
RTA_depth 697,428 0.286 1.057 0 7 
Note: HT, MT and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively. TRIPS takes the value of 1 from the 
year in which countries are first in compliance with TRIPS and 0 otherwise. WTO members were given different transition 
periods for the implementation of TRIPS laws and enforcement mechanisms. Developed countries were given one year, 
whereas developing countries and some transition economies were given five years (until 2000) and least developed 
countries initially had 11 years (until 2006), but the period was extended until 2013 for most products and even longer for a 
few sensitive products (pharmaceutical patents, undisclosed information protection).  
 
5. Main Results 
 
Table 2 shows the results of equation (4) estimated with the dependent variable in levels using PPML, 
which is based on the theoretically justified gravity model and includes MRT. The results of the 
corresponding log-log specification in equation (3) are presented in the Appendix (Table A.3), where 
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Table 2 presents the results for total exports in column 1. When using the PPML method,
20
 the 
estimated effects are generally larger than those obtained with the log-log model.
21
 The results for the 
variables of interest (RTA_tech and RTA_notech) suggest that while RTAs containing provisions of 
this type increase total exports by 24%
22
 for shallow agreements (RTA_depth=0), RTAs without such 
provisions also show a significant effect on total exports, of slightly higher magnitude.
23
 We also 
estimated the model with PPML eliminating zero trade flows, keeping the same number of 
observations as in the log-log model, and the results show that the effects of RTA_tech are smaller in 
magnitude (the RTA_tech coefficient is 0.081 instead of 0.215 for total exports)
24
.  
When the model is estimated for exports with different levels of technology content—HT, MT, and 
LT, according to the abovementioned UNCTAD classification—the results vary. For exports with HT 
content (in column 2, Table 2), agreements containing only technology provisions have a significant 
effect in terms of stimulating export growth, whereas agreements without such provisions are less 
effective. More specifically, the point coefficient for RTA_tech indicates that adding technology 
provisions to an RTA increases trade in HT products by 21% (column 2, first row) independently of 
whether or not the RTA contains any other type of provisions. Indeed, RTA_depth is not statistically 
significant for HT products (column 2), and the same is the case for RTA_notech. This means that the 
partial effect on trade of adding technology provisions is around 15%, [(exp{0.189-0.0526}-1)*100], 
																																								 																				
19
	The first column in Table A.3 presents the estimations using traditional gravity variables. In the second column, variables 
that vary by country are replaced by origin and destination fixed effects, and in the third column bilateral variables are 
replaced by dyadic fixed effects. The traditional gravity variables present the expected signs and magnitudes; the GDP 
coefficients are close to the theoretical value of one in column (1); distance, area and landlocked variables show negative 
and significant coefficients, and sharing a border, an official language or colonial ties all increase trade significantly, as 
expected. WTO membership, TRIPS and common currency all show positive and significant effects on total exports, which 
are reduced when controlling for country-time and pair fixed effects in column (4).	
20
The command ppml_panel_sg, written by Zylkin (2016), was used ("symmetric pair effects" option is appropriate for 
identification if all main variables are symmetric with respect to direction of trade, Zylkin post: Statalist 8th November 
2017).	
21
 According to Bergstrand et al. (2015), PPML estimates tend to be larger than OLS estimates for RTAs.	
22
	Compared with 14% for RTA_tech in column 4, Table A.3.	
23
 As usual, the percentage increase in trade attributed to RTAs is obtained by applying the exponential (anti-log) to the 
estimated coefficient, subtracting 1, and multiplying by 100.  
24
 Full results are available in the Appendix (Table A.4). 
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which we interpret as the direct effect, whereas the trade effect of eliminating trade policy barriers is 
around 6%. 
The results for exports with MT content are shown in column3 of Table 2. The effect of RTA_tech is 
positive and small for shallow RTAs, when RTA_depth=0, and lower in magnitude than the effect of 
RTA_notech, but for RTAs with more than 1 provision type (RTA_depth=2-7) the effect is significant 
and sizable. For those with LT content, the effect of RTA_tech is statistically significant even for 
shallow agreements and adds a 5% increase to the effect of RTA_notech (see column 4 in Table 2). 
The results also show that the coefficient of RTA_depth is positive and significant for MT and LT 
groups, indicating that deeper RTAs promote exports with MT content the most. In this estimation, 
TRIPS and WTO present collinearity problems and cannot be estimated in the same model. We show 
the results including TRIPS since it is more relevant in this setting. The estimated coefficient for 
TRIPS indicates that total exports and exports with LT content are positively affected, whereas the 
effect is not statistically significant for exports with MT and HT content. Finally, countries in a 
currency union trade substantially more than others, with the effect being slightly higher for total 
exports and exports with MT content. 
  
 
Table 2. Estimation of the Gravity Model for Export Flows (PPML) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable: X_Total X_HT X_MT X_LT 
 Ind. Variables:         
RTA_tech 0.215*** 0.189*** 0.0266 0.165*** 
 
(0.0318) (0.0440) (0.0359) (0.0355) 
RTA _notech 0.324*** 0.0526 0.452*** 0.118* 
 
(0.0576) (0.0478) (0.0503) (0.0625) 
RTA _depth 0.0441*** 0.000976 0.0784*** 0.0702*** 
 
(0.00620) (0.00735) (0.00750) (0.00781) 
Common currency  0.779*** 0.517*** 0.667*** 0.538*** 
 
(0.0414) (0.0418) (0.0405) (0.0349) 
TRIPS 0.540*** -0.0680 0.185 0.597*** 
 
(0.125) (0.197) (0.172) (0.0922) 
     Observations 587,469 608,560 626,353 627,756 
Pseudo R-squared 0.982 0.990 0.980 0.989 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel structural gravity estimation fixed effects 
included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer (symmetric). Clustered standard errors, clustered by exporter-
importer (default). HT, MT and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively. RTA_tech/_notech 
denote membership in Regional Trade Agreements with/without technology-related provisions. RTA_depth is an index that 
varies between 1 and 7, with higher numbers indicating that more provisions are included. 
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Since the effects estimated might be heterogeneous, and since the types of technology clause vary 
depending on whether the agreement is between developed countries and developing countries or 
between countries with similar income levels, we now proceed to evaluate the effect on trade by 
groups of countries and for each type of clause separately. The resulting information will enable us to 
identify the heterogeneity of the effects. 
5.1 Heterogeneous Effects for Different Groups of Countries and Technology Provisions 
In this section, we present our estimation of the gravity model after first identifying whether the trade 
flow is between developed countries (North: N) or developing ones (South: S), looking at the four 
possible origin/destination combinations (NS; NN; SN; and SS).
25
 Specification (4) is augmented with 
interactions between RTA_tech and the direction of trade flows. The results are presented in Table 3. 
The first rows show the coefficients obtained for the interaction terms. It can be observed in the first 
row that shallow RTAs (RTA_depth=0) with technology provisions between developed countries 
(NN) have a positive and significant effect on trade in high technology goods, but not on MT and LT 
goods. For trade between developing countries (SS) there is also an extra trade effect above the one 
obtained for RTA_notech, in this case for all types of goods. However, for agreements between 
developed and developing countries, the direct effect on trade of having technology-related provisions 
is negative for shallow RTAs, indicating that only when the depth of the agreements is considerable 
(RTA_depth>=4) can any indirect trade effect be magnified. The marginal effects of adding 
technology provisions for different levels of RTA depth are shown in Table 4. 
Table 3. Estimation of the Model with Heterogeneous Effects by Income Level  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: X_Total X_HT X_MT X_LT 
 Ind. 
Variables:         
RTA_tech_NN 0.352*** 0.143*** 0.0788 0.0738 
 
(0.0577) (0.0513) (0.0502) (0.0466) 
RTA_tech_NS -0.275*** -0.339*** -0.559*** -0.434*** 
 
(0.0431) (0.0875) (0.0607) (0.0541) 
																																								 																				
25
We use the United Nations definition, which for 2017 lists developed countries as being Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), 
Bulgaria (BGR), Canada (CAN), Croatia (HRV), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Rep. (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), 
Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), 
Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Malta (MLT), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway 
(NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), 
United Kingdom (GBR), and United States (USA). 
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RTA_tech_SN -0.256*** -0.0964** -0.438*** -0.401*** 
 
(0.0406) (0.0451) (0.0434) (0.0485) 
RTA_tech_SS 0.576*** 0.536*** 0.490*** 0.700*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0706) (0.0453) (0.0491) 
RTA_notech 0.209*** -0.0261 0.351*** 0.0347 
 
(0.0564) (0.0498) (0.0489) (0.0615) 
RTA_depth 0.0879*** 0.0345*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.00626) (0.00782) (0.00744) (0.00770) 
CU 0.700*** 0.481*** 0.598*** 0.470*** 
 
(0.0397) (0.0400) (0.0391) (0.0342) 
TRIPS 0.547*** -0.0294 0.236 0.599*** 
 
(0.117) (0.188) (0.161) (0.0896) 
     Observations 587,469 608,560 626,353 627,756 
R-squared 0.982 0.990 0.981 0.989 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel structural gravity estimation fixed effects 
included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer (symmetric). Clustered standard errors, clustered by 
exporter-importer (default). The coefficients of TRIPS, RTA_depth and Common currency variables are not shown to 
save space. Flow identifies whether the trade flow is between developed countries (North: N) or developing ones 
(South: S). HT, MT and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively. RTA_tech/_notech 
denote membership in Regional Trade Agreements with/without technology-related provisions. 
 The results shown in Table 3 also suggests that RTAs with technology provisions benefit exports 
between developing countries (SS) proportionately more, as indicated by the coefficient of 
RTA_tech_SS. They also benefit exports of goods with LT content relatively more, although they do 
still benefit HT and MT exports when the agreement includes technology provisions and exports go 
from one developing country to another.  
Table 4. Marginal Effects of adding technology-related provisions 
RTA_tech X_HT X_MT X_LT 
Trade Flow: RTA_depth=2 
 
  
NN 0.238 -0.014 0.283 
NS -0.244 -0.652 -0.225 
SN -0.001 -0.531 -0.192 
SS 0.631 0.397 0.909 
  RTA_depth=4     
NN 0.307 0.244 0.527 
NS -0.175 -0.394 0.019 
SN 0.068 -0.273 0.052 
SS 0.700 0.655 1.153 
  RTA_depth=7 
 
  
NN 0.411 0.631 0.893 
NS -0.071 -0.007 0.385 
SN 0.171 0.114 0.418 
SS 0.804 1.042 1.519 
Note: Effects calculated using the coefficients estimated in Table 3.  
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Table 4 shows that the incremental effect on exports of adding technology-related provisions is 
substantial for SS trade flows and increase with the depth of the RTAs (number of additional 
provisions on other subjects). For NN trade, the marginal effects are also positive for all types of 
goods when the depth of the RTA is at least 4, whereas for NS and SN negative marginal effects are 
shown for less inclusive RTAs (RTA_depth<4). This means that the short-run effects on trade of 
including technology-related provisions could lead to lower exports if the RTAs do not also regulate 
product, labor and environmental standards, for example. Finally, for RTAs of maximum depth, most 
marginal effects are shown to be positive, and it is only for exports from developed to developing 
countries (NS) that some small negative effects are found. 
Next, we differentiate between each of the four possible technology clause types. The gravity model is 
estimated with each provision relating to technology and innovation included separately in a single 
model for total exports and exports of HT, MT and LT goods. The aim is to ascertain whether the 
different types of provisions have a different direct effect on exports. The results, shown in Table 5, 
indicate that we cannot accept that the RTA with provisions affects exports equally for each type of 
provision. In particular, for total exports (column 1) RTAs with provisions on intellectual property 
rights and patents increase exports significantly more than RTAs without such provisions, whereas 
those with technology transfer, technical cooperation or R&D provisions show a negative coefficient, 
indicating that for shallow agreements the addition of those provisions does not magnify the trade 
effect of basic RTAs; on the contrary, they reduce it. For HT goods, both intellectual property rights 
and technical cooperation seem to exert a positive effect on exports, which is not present for RTAs 
without technology provisions (RTA_notech is not statistically significant in column 2). However, 
adding technology transfer provisions seems to decrease HT exports, perhaps due to the fact that it 
will facilitate importers’ specialization in the production and exports of these goods. Concerning MT 
and LT exports, it also seems in this case that the most influential provisions are those concerning 
patents and intellectual property; and once again, the additional trade effect is positive and slightly 
higher than for HT goods. However, adding provisions in the other three categories considered does 
seem to reduce exports. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results for the Four Types of Technology Provisions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: X_Total X_HT X_MT X_LT 
 Ind. Variables:         
Technical Cooperation -0.135*** 0.0923* -0.0769* -0.130*** 
 
(0.0421) (0.0547) (0.0414) (0.0466) 
Technology Transfer -0.137*** -0.343*** -0.242*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.0439) (0.0585) (0.0498) (0.0512) 
Research and 
Development -0.188*** 0.0496 -0.129** -0.356*** 
 
(0.0453) (0.0685) (0.0520) (0.0528) 
Patents and Intellectual 
Property 0.433*** 0.217*** 0.240*** 0.415*** 
 
(0.0444) (0.0547) (0.0430) (0.0466) 
RTA_notech 0.293*** 0.0156 0.441*** 0.0824 
 
(0.0571) (0.0483) (0.0495) (0.0617) 
RTA_depth 0.0525*** 0.0132* 0.0841*** 0.0849*** 
 
(0.00667) (0.00746) (0.00770) (0.00809) 
CU 0.754*** 0.502*** 0.652*** 0.517*** 
 
(0.0411) (0.0405) (0.0399) (0.0347) 
TRIPS 0.526*** -0.0694 0.194 0.590*** 
 
(0.120) (0.193) (0.169) (0.0921) 
     Observations 587,469 608,560 626,353 627,756 
R-squared 0.981 0.990 0.979 0.989 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel structural gravity estimation fixed effects 
included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer (symmetric). Clustered standard errors, clustered by exporter-
importer (default). The coefficients of TRIPS, RTA_depth and Common currency variables are not shown to save space. HT, 
MT and LT denote high, medium and low technology-content, respectively. RTA_tech/_notech denote membership in 
Regional Trade Agreements with/without technology-related provisions. 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks 
As alternatives to the estimations presented here, the model was estimated for time intervals as 
suggested in Yotov et al. (2016) and the results for the target variables were practically unchanged.  
Table A.5 shows the results using data for every three years.  
Second, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) to test for the potential endogeneity of the 
trade policy variable, we have estimated the model including 4 leads of the RTA variables. The results 
were used to test for the joint significance of the 4 leads of the RTA variables.
26
 The fact that the sum 
of the t+1 to t+4 coefficients is not statistically significant indicates that we are effectively controlling 
for endogeneity using bilateral time-invariant fixed effects.  Moreover, we adopt the strategy proposed 
																																								 																				
26
	 Using a test of linear combinations of the coefficients: lincom in Stata. Results available upon request.	
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by the same authors of incorporating the RTA variable with a number of different lags to consider the 
effects of phasing in trade agreements; the estimated coefficients indicate that the effects materialized 
between 4 and 8 years after the entry into force of the RTA, depending on the type of goods traded. 
Third, we have replicated the results in Campi and Dueñas (2019) using the gravity model with 
the dependent variable in logarithms and with pair fixed effects, but without MRT. The results, 
reported in Table A.6, show that the RTA coefficient is very similar to the one obtained by those 
authors, whereas the coefficients for the RTA with and without intellectual property provisions differ. 
We obtained a positive and significant effect for the RTA with intellectual property provisions and a 
not statistically significant coefficient for RTA without, whereas they reported a stronger and positive 
effect for RTA without intellectual property provisions. This could be due to the fact that the number 
of observations in our estimations is almost double that used by Campi and Dueñas (2019), despite the 
fact that we restricted the sample of countries to match their sample. More research is needed to find 
the cause of the divergence in the results. 
Finally, we have replicated the results in Dhringra et al. (2018) for gross exports of goods using 
high dimensional fixed effects with 2-year (as in their baseline model) and 4-year time intervals. The 
results are shown in Table A.7. Columns 1 and 2 are comparable to those in columns 1 and 4 of Table 
A1 (Dhringra et al., 2018, page 25). Columns 4 to 8 replicate their Table A17 (Dhringra et al., 2018, 
apge 38). We confirm that for their sample of 43 countries the coefficient on intellectual property 
provisions is not statistically significant, whereas in the extended sample a positive and significant 
effect is found for it, as it is the case in our estimations. 
Conclusions 
Including innovation provisions for direct technology transfer in RTAs has different effects on exports 
depending on the direction of trade, the level of development of the countries of origin and 
destination, and the type of clause included in the agreement. The main results of this study indicate 
that regional trade agreements (RTAs) that contain technology-related provisions generate a 
significantly higher aggregate volume of trade than RTAs that do not, after controlling for the depth 
of the agreements. When all countries are considered, for those that ratify RTAs with such provisions 
rather than those without, it is exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the most.  
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Patterns found in the results indicate which countries or sectors should benefit from the inclusion of 
technology provisions. SS agreements have positive effects on exports of HT, MT and LT, which are 
higher in magnitude for LT exports; this finding reflects their relatively low level of technological 
development. In NN agreements, the effects of RTAs are less pronounced. For RTAs between 
countries with different levels of development the addition of technology-related provision could have 
detrimental effects on exports in the short run, but this depends on the depth of the RTAs. For deep 
and comprehensive trade agreements the additional trade effect tends to be positive for almost all 
trade flows, with only exports from developed to developing countries showing small negative effects. 
The good news is that for the most part our results support the inclusion of intellectual property 
related provisions in the RTAs, given that those provisions seem to exert an additional positive effect 
on trade, even for shallow RTAs. Conversely, provisions related to technology transfer, R&D and 
technical cooperation might be looser and hence less effective. 
In certain circumstances, the existence of provisions may not be enough in itself to guarantee effective 
technology transfer. To complement them, it may be necessary to create appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms to build on the vague provisions in trade agreements. These might take the form of 
monitoring committees formed of representatives from both parties whose sole function is to ensure 




The WTO laid the groundwork for technology transfer through TRIPS and has urged developed 
countries to create reports to document the steps they have taken to apply the articles on cooperation 
in their relations with lower-income countries. In line with these commitments, it is important to 
continuously assess the impact of agreements, especially the aspects that relate to technology transfer, 
an issue which is by nature constantly changing. By estimating how RTAs containing different types 
of innovation and technology transfer provisions affect trade, this study is intended as a step in this 
direction. The main results suggest that it is important for agreements to include such provisions, 
particularly if they are to be effective at increasing medium-technology exports from new 
																																								 																				
27
 This was the case for the Chile–China agreement, following which the Permanent Binational Commission and 
the Mechanism for Strategic Dialogue for Economic Cooperation and Coordination were created. For more 
examples, see Chelala (2018).  
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industrialized countries to developing countries, which in turn facilitates knowledge and technology 
transfer between countries and generates technology spillovers. 
To distinguish between the effects of the provisions depending on the enforcement mechanisms that 
are set out in the RTAs, this study could be extended by classifying RTA provisions according to how 
stringently they are enforced. Alternatively, a more straightforward approach could be to see whether 
effects vary depending on levels of rule of law and the effectiveness of governance in exporter 
countries. 
We also leave for future research the estimation of the effects of RTAs containing innovation and 
technology provisions on the technological level of the countries that ratify such agreements, 
distinguishing between the pure trade effect effects and those that are due to direct technology 
transfer. To that end, the trade forecasts obtained from the gravity model could be included, together 
with proxies for participation in RTAs with those provisions, in a model of the determinants of R&D 
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Figure A.1. Distribution of High-Technology-Content Exports by Type of Agreement  
 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lexp is ln of high-tech exports. Years 1995 to 
2017. 
Figure A.2. Distribution of Medium-Technology-Content Exports by Type of Agreement  
 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on RTAs and exports (UNCTAD). Lxmtet is ln of medium-tech exports. Years 1995 to 
2017. 
Figure A.1. Distribution of Low-Technology-Content Exports by Type of Agreement  
 






























































Table A.1. List of Countries 
Afghanistan Czech Rep. Kuwait Rwanda 
Albania Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyzstan Samoa 
Algeria People's Rep. of Korea Lao People's Dem. Rep. Sao Tome and Principe 
Angola Denmark Latvia Saudi Arabia 
Antigua and Barbuda Djibouti Lebanon Senegal 
Argentina Dominica Lesotho Seychelles 
Armenia Dominican Rep. Liberia Sierra Leone 
Australia Ecuador Libya Singapore 
Austria Egypt Lithuania Slovakia 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Luxembourg Slovenia 
Bahamas Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Solomon Isds 
Bahrain Eritrea Malawi Somalia 
Bangladesh Estonia Malaysia South Africa 
Barbados Ethiopia Maldives Spain 
Belarus Fiji Mali Sri Lanka 
Belize Finland Malta Sudan 
Benin France Mauritania Suriname 
Bermuda Gabon Mauritius Swaziland 
Bhutan Gambia Mexico Sweden 
Bolivia Georgia Mongolia Switzerland 
Bosnia Herzegovina Germany Morocco Syria 
Botswana Ghana Mozambique TFYR of Macedonia 
Brazil Greece Myanmar Tajikistan 
Brunei Darussalam Greenland Namibia Thailand 
Bulgaria Guatemala Nepal Togo 
Burkina Faso Guinea Netherlands Tonga 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Cambodia Guyana Nicaragua Tunisia 
Cameroon Haiti Niger Turkey 
Canada Honduras Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde Hungary Norway Tuvalu 
Central African Rep. Iceland Oman USA 
Chad Indonesia Pakistan Uganda 
Chile Iran Palau Ukraine 
China Iraq Panama United Arab Emirates 
China, Hong Kong SAR Ireland Papua New Guinea United Kingdom 
China, Macao SAR Israel Paraguay Uruguay 
Colombia Italy Peru Uzbekistan 
Comoros Jamaica Philippines Vanuatu 
Congo Japan Poland Venezuela 
Costa Rica Jordan Portugal Viet Nam 
Croatia Kazakhstan Qatar Yemen 
Cuba Kenya Rep. of Korea Zambia 




Table A.2. Classification of Goods  
Lall (20002) Classification from UNCTAD 
DC04 Low technology manufactures: textile, garment and footwear 
611  Leather  
612  Manufactures of leather, n.e.s.; saddlery & harness  
613  Furskins, tanned or dressed, excluding those of 8483  
651  Textile yarn  
652  Cotton fabrics, woven  
654  Other textile fabrics, woven  
655  Knitted or crocheted fabrics, n.e.s.  
656  Tulles, trimmings, lace, ribbons & other small wares  
657  Special yarn, special textile fabrics & related  
658  Made-up articles, of textile materials, n.e.s.  
659  Floor coverings, etc.  
831 Travel goods, handbags & similar containers  
841  Men's clothing of textile fabrics, not knitted  
842  Women's clothing, of textile fabrics  
843  Men's or boys’ clothing, of textile, knitted, croche.  
844  Women's clothing, of textile, knitted or crocheted  
845  Articles of apparel, of textile fabrics, n.e.s.  
846  Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics  
848 Articles of apparel, clothing access., excluding textile 
851 Footwear 
LDC05 Low technology manufactures: other products 
 642 Paper & paperboard, cut to shape or size, article 
665  Glassware  
666  Pottery  
673  Flat-rolled prod., iron, non-alloy steel, not coated  
674  Flat-rolled prod., iron, non-alloy steel, coated, clad  
675  Flat-rolled products of alloy steel  
676  Iron & steel bars, rods, angles, shapes & sections  
677  Rails & railway track construction mat., iron, steel  
678  Wire of iron or steel  
691  Structures & parts, n.e.s., of iron, steel, aluminium  
692  Metal containers for storage or transport  
693  Wire products (excluding electrical) and fencing grills  
694  Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets & the like, of metal  
695  Tools for use in the hand or in machine  
696  Cutlery  
697  Household equipment of base metal, n.e.s.  
699 Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 821 Furniture & parts  
893  Articles, n.e.s., of plastics  
894  Baby carriages, toys, games & sporting goods  
895  Office & stationery supplies, n.e.s.  
897  Jewellery & articles of precious materia., n.e.s.  
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898  Musical instruments, parts; records, tapes & similar  
899  Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s.  
LDC06 Medium technology manufactures: automotive 
781  Motor vehicles for the transport of persons  
782  Motor vehic. for transport of goods, special purpo.  
783  Road motor vehicles, n.e.s.  
784  Parts & accessories of vehicles of 722, 781, 782, 783  
785  Motorcycles & cycles  
LDC07 Medium technology manufactures: process  
266  Synthetic fibres suitable for spinning  
267  Other man-made fibres suitable for spinning  
512  Alcohols, phenols, halogenat., sulfonat., nitrat. der.  
513  Carboxylic acids, anhydrides, halides, per.; derivati.  
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials  
553  Perfumery, cosmetics or toilet prepar. (excluding soaps)  
554  Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations  
562 Fertilizers (other than those of group 272)  
571  Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms  
572  Polymers of styrene, in primary forms  
573  Polymers of vinyl chloride or halogenated olefins  
574  Polyethers, epoxide resins; polycarbonat., polyesters  
575  Other plastics, in primary forms  
579 Waste, parings and scrap, of plastics  
581  Tubes, pipes and hoses of plastics  
582  Plates, sheets, films, foil & strip, of plastics  
583  Monofilaments, of plastics, cross-section > 1mm  
591 Insecticides & similar products, for retail sale  
593 Explosives and pyrotechnic products  
597  Prepared addit. for miner. oils; lubricat., de-icing  
598  Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e.s.  
653 Fabrics, woven, of man-made fabrics  
671  Pig iron & spiegeleisen, sponge iron, powder & granu  
672  Ingots, primary forms, of iron or steel; semi-finis.  
679 Tubes, pipes & hollow profiles, fittings, iron, steel 
786 Trailers & semi-trailers 
791 Railway vehicles & associated equipment 
882 Cinematographic & photographic supplies 
LDC08 Medium technology manufactures: engineering 
711 Vapour generating boilers, auxiliary plant parts 
713  Internal combustion piston engines, parts, n.e.s.  
714  Engines & motors, non-electric; parts, n.e.s.  
721  Agricultural machinery (excluding tractors) & parts  
722  Tractors (excluding those of 71414 & 74415)  
723  Civil engineering & contractors' plant & equipment  
724  Textile & leather machinery, & parts thereof, n.e.s.  
725  Paper mill, pulp mill machinery; paper articles man.  
726  Printing & bookbinding machinery, & parts thereof  
727  Food-processing machines (excluding domestic)  
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728  Other machinery for particular industries, n.e.s.  
731 Machine-tools working by removing material  
733 Mach.-tools for working metal, excluding removing mate.  
735 Parts, n.e.s., & accessories for machines of 731, 733 
737 Metalworking machinery (excluding machine-tools) & parts  
741  Heating & cooling equipment & parts thereof, n.e.s.  
742  Pumps for liquids  
743  Pumps (excluding liquid), gas compressors & fans; centr.  
744  Mechanical handling equipment, & parts, n.e.s.  
745  Other non-electr. machinery, tools & mechan. appar.  
746  Ball or roller bearings  
747  Appliances for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats, etc.  
748  Transmis. shafts  
749  Non-electric parts & accessor. of machinery, n.e.s.  
762  Radio-broadcast receivers, whether or not combined  
763  Sound recorders or reproducers  
772  Apparatus for electrical circuits; board, panels  
773  Equipment for distributing electricity, n.e.s.  
775 Household type equipment, electrical or not, n.e.s.   
793 Ships, boats & floating structures 
811  Prefabricated buildings  
812  Sanitary, plumbing, heating fixtures, fittings, n.e.s.  
813  Lighting fixtures & fittings, n.e.s.  
872  Instruments & appliances, n.e.s., for medical, etc.  
873  Meters & counters, n.e.s.  
884 Optical goods, n.e.s.  
LDC09 High technology manufactures: electronic and electrical 
716 Rotating electric plant & parts thereof, n.e.s. 
718 Other power generating machinery & parts, n.e.s.  
751 Office machines  
752 Automatic data processing machines, n.e.s.  
759 Parts, accessories for machines of groups 751, 752 
761 Television receivers, whether or not combined 
764 Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; & parts, n.e.s.  
771 Electric power machinery, and parts thereof 
774 Electro-diagnostic appa. for medical sciences, etc. 
776 Cathode valves & tubes 
778 Electrical machinery & apparatus, n.e.s. 
LDC10 High technology manufactures: other 
525 Radio-actives and associated materials  
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, excluding 542  
542 Medicaments (incl. veterinary medicaments)  
712 Steam turbines & other vapour turbin., parts, n.e.s. 
792 Aircraft & associated equipment; spacecraft, etc. 
871 Optical instruments & apparatus, n.e.s. 
874 Measuring, analysing & controlling apparatus, n.e.s. 





Table A.3. Estimation of the Traditional Log-Linearized Gravity Model for Export Flows 




Time FE  
Origin, 
destination
,time FE  
Pair and 
time FE  
 
Pair, origin-time, destination-time FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
variable: 
lnX_total lnX_total LX_total lnX_total lnX_HT LX_MT lnX_LT 
Independent 
variables: 
       
RTA_tech 0.791*** 1.067*** 0.236*** 0.134*** -0.036 0.221*** 0.153*** 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.032) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) 
RTA_notech 1.126*** 0.982*** -0.003 -0.055** -0.116*** 0.061** -0.032 
 (0.068) (0.064) (0.037) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) 
RTA_depth -0.037*** -0.118*** 0.021*** 0.006 0.017*** -0.018*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
WTO members 0.285*** 0.220*** 0.192*** 0.135*** 0.044 0.095* 0.075* 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.035) (0.055) (0.055) (0.044) 
TRIPS 0.233*** 0.227*** 0.132*** 0.063** 0.192*** 0.116*** 0.082*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) (0.028) 
Common currency 0.387*** 0.179* 0.182*** 0.165*** 0.302*** 0.151*** 0.273*** 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.033) (0.024) (0.039) (0.035) (0.029) 
Ln GDP_exporter 1.228*** 0.309*** 0.431***     
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.023)     
Ln GDP_importer 0.976*** 0.727*** 0.811***     
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.018)     
Ln distance -1.149*** -1.450***      
 (0.017) (0.019)      
Common language 0.709*** 0.690***      
 (0.037) (0.038)      
Common border 0.978*** 0.615***      
 (0.099) (0.098)      
Colonial ties 0.844*** 0.875***      
 (0.053) (0.048)      
Ln Area_exporter -0.083***       
 (0.006)       
Ln Area_importer -0.011*       
 (0.007)       
Landlocked_export
er 
-0.500***       
 (0.033)       
Landlocked_import
er 
-0.408***       
 (0.032)       
Observations 387,180 387,180 387,180 402,398 285,565 314,413 329,052 
Adjusted R-squared 0.670 0.740 0.153 0.879 0.860 0.837 0.868 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by pair (exporter-importer) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. HT, MT 
and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively. The number of bilateral trade flows included in 
columns (1) to (3) is 27,242. Ln denotes natural logs. RTA_tech/_notech denote membership in Regional Trade Agreements 
with/without technology-related provisions and RTA_depth is an index that varies between 1 and 7, with higher numbers 




Table A.4. Results excluding zero trade flows (PPML) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: X_Total X_HT X_MT X_LT 
 Ind. Variables:        
RTA_tech 0.0807*** 0.171*** -0.000764 0.129*** 
 
(0.0270) (0.0439) (0.0358) (0.0351) 
RTA_notech 0.323*** 0.0419 0.428*** 0.104* 
 
(0.0526) (0.0477) (0.0498) (0.0618) 
RTA_depth 0.0340*** 0.00294 0.0818*** 0.0755*** 
 
(0.00535) (0.00732) (0.00746) (0.00781) 
Common 
currency 0.215*** 0.515*** 0.663*** 0.536*** 
 
(0.0248) (0.0417) (0.0405) (0.0350) 
TRIPS 0.451*** -0.0526 0.197 0.626*** 
 
(0.114) (0.198) (0.175) (0.0922) 
     Observations 402,398 285,565 314,413 329,052 
R-squared 0.988 0.990 0.981 0.990 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by pair (exporter-importer) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel 
structural gravity estimation fixed effects included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer (symmetric). 
RTA_tech/_notech denotes membership in Regional Trade Agreements with/without technology-related provisions. HT, MT 
and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively. 
 
Table A.5. Intervals every three years and by export type (PPML) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: X_Total X_HT X_MT X_LT 
 Ind. Variables:         
RTA_tech 0.173*** 0.153*** 0.0196 0.183*** 
 
(0.0327) (0.0433) (0.0363) (0.0367) 
RTA_notech 0.291*** 0.0263 0.433*** 0.112* 
 
(0.0571) (0.0474) (0.0515) (0.0642) 
RTA_depth 0.0498*** 0.00292 0.0801*** 0.0638*** 
 
(0.00635) (0.00735) (0.00752) (0.00786) 
Common 
currency 0.694*** 0.454*** 0.618*** 0.488*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0427) (0.0410) (0.0350) 
TRIPS 0.579*** -0.122 0.231 0.649*** 
 
(0.138) (0.216) (0.178) (0.0978) 
 
  
   Observations 222,259 219,698 229,662 230,140 
 R-Squared 0.982 0.991 0.981 0.989 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by pair (exporter-importer) in parentheses.. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel 
structural gravity estimation fixed effects included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer (symmetric). 
RTA_tech/_notech denotes membership in Regional Trade Agreements with/without technology-related provisions. HT, MT 
and LT denote high, medium and low technology content, respectively.   
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Table A.6. Replication of Campi and Dueñas (2018) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable lnX_Total lnX_Total lnX_Total lnX_Total lnX_Total lnX_Total 
 
ij FE ij FE ij FE ij FE ij FE ij FE 
 Independent Variables             
RTA 0.085*** 
     
 
(0.022) 








(0.033) (0.030) (0.030) 
RTA_IP 
  
0.163*** 0.161*** 0.127*** 0.135*** 
   
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
L5. RTA_noIP 
    
0.005 0.008 
     
(0.033) (0.033) 
L5. RTA_IP 
    
0.088*** 0.096*** 
     
(0.028) (0.028) 
lrgdp_exp 1.103*** 1.103*** 1.111*** 1.113*** 0.981*** 0.966*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) 
lrgdp_imp 1.248*** 1.248*** 1.255*** 1.257*** 1.398*** 1.385*** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
hc_imp 0.339*** 0.345*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.109 0.073 
 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.107) (0.106) 
hc_exp 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.119 0.083 
 
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.110) (0.109) 
TRIPS 
     
0.387*** 
      
(0.038) 
       Observations 223,018 223,018 223,018 223,018 168,582 168,582 
Number of id 13,730 13,730 13,730 13,730 13,694 13,694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.183 0.184 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by pair (exporter-importer) in parentheses.. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
RTA_IP/_noIP denotes membership in Regional Trade Agreements with/without Intellectual Property-related provisions. L5 
denote the corresponding variable at period (t-5). Lrgdp_exp, lrgdp_imp denotes real gross domestic product of the exporter 
and the importer, respectively and hc_exp, hc_imp denotes human capital index for the exporter and the importer, both 
variables from the Penn World Tables.
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Table A.7 Results using Dhringra et al. (2018) samples 
 
 WIOD Sample of 43 countries (2001-2014) Countries in Table A.1 (1995-2014) 
Dep. Variable:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LnX_Total 2y_interval 2y_interval 2y_interval 4y_interval 4y_interval 4y_interval 4y_interval 4y_interval 4y_interval 
Ind. Variables          
RTA -0.028 -0.038 -0.027 -0.054 -0.244*** -0.197* 0.067*** -0.002 -0.050 
 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.043) (0.063) (0.093) (0.102) (0.022) (0.033) (0.042) 































       
(0.064) 
TRIPS  




       
(0.047) 
Common Currency  








        Observations 14,600 14,600 14,600 8,297 8,297 8,297 112,208 112,208 112,134 
Adjusted R-squared 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.873 0.873 0.873 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by pair (exporter-importer) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ln denotes natural logs. RTA /_depth denote membership in Regional Trade 
Agreements /with Intellectual Property-related provisions and RTA_depth is an index that varies between 1 and 7, with higher numbers indicating that more provisions are included. Panel 
structural gravity estimation fixed effects included: exporter-year, importer-year, exporter-importer. 
